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Abstract 
Face-coverings were widely mandated during the Covid-19 pandemic, on the assumption that they limit 
the spread of respiratory viruses and are therefore likely to save lives. I examine the following ethical 
dilemma: if the use of face-masks in social settings can save lives then are we obliged to wear them at all 
times in those settings? I argue that by en-masking the face in a way that is phenomenally inconsistent 
with or degraded from what we are innately programmed to detect as human likeness, we are degrading 
the social quality of our relations. Drawing on my previously published proof that Self is socially reflexive 
(mutually mirrored) rather than monadic in its constitution, I conclude that any widespread en-masking 
is also deleterious to humanity and therefore unethical. 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
There are many respiratory viruses in continuous global circulation that can be deadly, including several 
coronaviruses (Roussel, et al. 2020) and seasonal Influenza. Moreover, novel viruses with pandemic 
potential can emerge and spread before an effective public health intervention could be instituted. If 
saving lives by wearing face-masks is a valid normative principle and the risk of potentially deadly 
respiratory viral infections is always present, then we ought to wear face-masks at all times when in the 
proximity of others. Given that eyes, phenomenologically speaking, do not by themselves constitute a face, 
the said normative principle commits us to live in a world without direct face to face relations; we would 
not see any other faces, neither those of our children nor our parents, nor friends, unless those faces were 
mediated by a screen, phenomenologically denaturalised, and, in the process, alienated. We can 
intuitively imagine the consequences of living in such an extremely risk-averse world; for mental health, 
for human relations, for culture, for empathy, for love, for humanity, but we may nevertheless try to 
justify these negative outcomes on utilitarian grounds. After all, dying from a viral infection would also be 
a negative outcome. I argue that the utilitarian approach fails irrespective of the epidemiological benefits 
of mask-wearing vis-a-vis the magnitude of the threat; mask-mandates for social settings are not a 
rational or ethical solution to a medical problem, because they negate the reasons we care for human life 
in the first place. 
One of the most replicated protocols in developmental psychology, the Still Face Experiment designed by 
Edward Tronick, examines the function of reciprocal face-to-face relations in child development (for a 
historical overview see Adamson & Frick 2003). The protocol became a benchmark for measurements of 
infant cognition and behaviour; infants find the absence of responsive facial expression more disturbing 
than other violations of normal social interactions. An infant, when faced with an expressionless mother, 
"makes repeated attempts to get the interaction into its usual reciprocal pattern. When these attempts 
fail, the infant withdraws [and] orients his face and body away from his mother with a withdrawn, 
hopeless facial expression." (Tronick, et al. 1975) Reciprocal face-to-face interaction with the primary 
care-giver affects brain development, promoting neural sensitivity to social cues that is "critical for 
understanding others' internal states, and thus for regulating social relationships" and "serving as a basis 
for the development of more advanced socio-cognitive skills". (Rayson, et al. 2017) In adulthood, our 
emotional states are determined more strongly by the facial expressions of others than by our own 
predisposition (Moore, Gorodnitsky and Pineda 2011), suggesting that social engagement is driven by 
reflexive face processing. 
Phenomenologically, our sense of Self is grounded in the reflexivity (mutual mirroring) of face-to-face 
relations. As I have shown elsewhere, we can identify as I, as Self, only in terms of what we identify with, 
and we can rationally identify with only in terms of what we perceive to be a-like (Kowalik 2020). We are 
the likeness of Man, the universal face in which we recognise our humanity as the humanity of others, and 
vice versa. The ancient concept of Anthropos, 'one who is alike', 'of human likeness', is not merely a 
historical artefact but a profound, metaphysical insight. Unless I can compare my innate human likeness 
to the likeness of another there is literally nothing like being me, because being me entails awareness that 
I am like someone else. The mask conceals our innate human-likeness from one another, and thus 
progressively, phenomenologically, disrupts the recognition of our common humanity. By erasing or en-
masking the face in our social relations we are therefore degrading the social quality of those relations. 
Critically, relating face to face is a condition of ethical intuition: "The access to the face is lived in the 
ethical mode. The face, all by itself, has a meaning." (Levinas 1999, 104) 
“Directness of the face-to-face, a ‘between us’, already conversation, already dialogue and hence 
distance and quite the opposite of the contact in which coincidence and identification occur. But this 
is precisely the distance of proximity, the marvel of the social relation. In that relation, the difference 
between the I and the other remains. But it is maintained as the denial, in proximity which is also 
difference, of its own negation, as non-in-difference toward one another. Like the non-indifference 
between close friends or relatives. Being concerned by the alterity of the other: fraternity.” (Levinas 
1999, 93-94) 
Your face is that which speaks to me, that sees me, that hears me; all these modes of reflexive 
communication occur simultaneously, in one embodiment, phenomenally unified and individualised as 
another Self. Conversely, my face is that which speaks of others, and sees others seeing me. If these 
signals were disjointed, emanated without a face, there would be no phenomenological unity to these 
distinct modes of information, no personhood. Ultimately, the face itself communicates, non-verbally, 
visually; it conveys those subtleties of expression that make us human vis-a-vis one another, barely 
perceptible but nevertheless crucially, innately meaningful. This reflexive recognition is perhaps detected 
subconsciously, as an instantaneous bond that we may honour (and thus be true to the kind) or violate 
(and thus negate our kind and, implicitly, our own agency).  
Imagine a world without faces; inhabitants of such a world could not possibly develop language, meaning 
or purpose, because they would lack phenomenal individuality - a discernible, unified likeness-to-kind. If 
their sight and language were manifested via some other unified source then That source would be the 
totalising feature of their personhood, their Face. In essence, the face is just an apprehension of conscious 
agency, the phenomenal realisation of personhood, so it is almost tautologically true that without a face 
there is no personhood, no Self, therefore no social relations. 
To be clear, it is not just the 'lack' of face to face interaction that is deleterious to self-consciousness, but 
the phenomenological counterfeiting of faces; the act of negation "of an identity that is already 
performatively constituted via reflexive-relating of an individual with other individuals, already 
actualised by others 'for me' as someone who shares the evolved capacities, commitments or other 
properties of my identity-grounding kind." (Kowalik 2020) Face-masks function as a proxy for 
personhood that is not true to the kind. By relating to others in a way that is phenomenally inconsistent 
with or degraded from what we are innately programmed to detect as human likeness, we are distorting 
and degrading our own, innate sense of self, our humanity, which is not individually self-sufficient but 
socially reflexive. By de-facing others, we dehumanise ourselves; by de-facing ourselves, we dehumanise 
others, and therefore also ourselves.  
The crucial ethical question is whether it is right to dehumanise ourselves and others to some degree for 
fear of death. If without face-to-face relations we are not human, and given that humanity is the basis of 
all our value commitments, then without it nothing has value or value-oriented purpose. Under these 
conditions the alleged utilitarian purpose of reducing the risk of spreading germs is no longer rational. 
Another way, by dehumanising ourselves we negate precisely that which we are aiming to protect, our 
Human existence, therefore contradiction. Self-negating reasons cannot be normative, therefore cannot 
be ethical.  
The phenomenological disruption associated with the widespread use of face-masks limits our 
apprehension of the dominant human features and thus progressively isolates and alienates us from one 
another. The abnormal en-masking, distancing and isolating routines are nevertheless advanced as 
something beneficial to our health on narrow utilitarian grounds, failing to take into account their 
negative ontological impact. If my argument is correct then face-mask mandates ought to be urgently 
abolished on the grounds that they are universally harmful to human agency and therefore inhumane. 
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